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Accountability Lost and the Problem(s) of 
Asymmetry 
Gregory M. Gilchrist* 
 Professor Gilchrist argues that calls for more individual prosecutions in 
cases of corporate malfeasance are ultimately misguided. In this Essay, 
Gilchrist discusses the asymmetries of information and power within 
corporations that make criminal prosecutions of high-level executives 
particularly difficult and often inappropriate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Whither accountability? Loyola University Chicago recently posed 
this question at a symposium marking ten years since the Lehman 
collapse and all that followed.1 The answer, both implied and correct, is 
yes. 
Few people faced any consequences following the crisis, and this lack 
of consequences eroded public confidence in the justice system. As Judge 
Rakoff famously wrote nearly five years ago, “if . . . the Great Recession 
was in material part the product of intentional fraud, the failure to 
prosecute those responsible must be judged one of the more egregious 
failures of the criminal justice system in many years.”2 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. JD, Columbia. AB, Stanford. I would 
like to thank Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Steve Ramirez, and Shelley Dunck for 
hosting the symposium and for including me. I would like to thank Alexandra Harrington and the 
editors of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for their outstanding work on this Essay.  
1. Program, Loyola’s Annual Institute for Investor Protection Roundtable Conference, Lehman 
10 Years Later: Lessons Learned? (Sept. 14, 2018), http://www.ilep.info/pdf/symposia/ 
2018_LUC_IIP_Program.pdf. 
2. Jed S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives Been Prosecuted?, 
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Jan. 9, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/01/09/financial-crisis-
why-no-executive-prosecutions/. 
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Five years later, there have been no further consequences, and none are 
likely. Accordingly, “[i]n the popular imagination, the people who caused 
the crisis got away with it scot-free, and, as what scientists call a 
first-order approximation, that’s about right.”3 The banks were bailed out, 
the bankers were not prosecuted,4 and the public suffered years of 
austerity and fallout from one of the worst financial crises in history. 
The public demand for accountability is strong. It most often takes the 
form of demanding that those real people who engage in misconduct on 
behalf of corporations be criminally prosecuted. This demand extends 
beyond the financial industry to all forms of corporate malfeasance. We 
hear the call when something goes seriously wrong, whether it is a 
financial crisis with links to financial instruments of practically 
alchemical provenance, or the catastrophic harm to the Gulf of Mexico 
following the failure of an offshore drilling rig: Jail the bankers, lock up 
the executives! 
The most formal—and accordingly tempered—iteration of this push is 
the Yates Memorandum (Yates Memo), published by then-Deputy 
Attorney General Sally Yates in 2015.5 The Yates Memo provided 
guidance to federal prosecutors and directed particular changes to the 
Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, all aimed at 
generating more prosecutions of individuals in cases of corporate 
wrongdoing.6 Specifically, the Yates Memo precluded leniency for 
corporations cooperating with the Department of Justice unless the entity 
provided all information about individuals involved in the misconduct.7 
 
3. John Lanchester, After the Fall, LONDON REV. BOOKS (July 5, 2018), https://www.lrb.co.uk/ 
v40/n13/john-lanchester/after-the-fall. 
4. To be clear, in the popular imagination, this is the crux of the problem. Most criticism, both 
popular and scholarly, has been of the failure to hold individuals working in the financial sector 
responsible. After all, these “bankers” introduced unacceptable risks to the economy while 
insulating themselves and their firms from the failure. That bankers are most responsible for the 
crisis mirrors the conventional wisdom; it’s also probably correct simply as a matter of proximate 
cause. As with any crisis of this magnitude and complexity, however, there were other culprits too. 
For example, the vast majority of the American public accumulated greater and greater debt on the 
now-incredible-but-then-widely-held assumption that real property would always appreciate. This 
Essay, following the lead of the Symposium, concentrates on the lack of accountability for those 
working in the financial sector. 
5. See Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, U.S. Deputy Attorney Gen., to All U.S. 
Attorneys 2 (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download [hereinafter Yates 
Memo]. As I discuss further below, the demand for more individual accountability is not a singular 
or uniform call. The pure populist demand for blood is quite distinct from the measured call by 
Judge Rakoff, former Deputy Attorney General Yates, and others who are carefully trying to 
improve the legal system. My contention, however, is that the populist demand empowers measured 
efforts like the Yates Memo, and such efforts, in turn, are likely to result in quite different 
prosecutions than their drafters might have hoped. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 3. 
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Additionally, it directed federal prosecutors to prioritize individual 
prosecutions when investigating and resolving corporate crimes.8 
 Sally Yates’s successor, Rod Rosenstein, has said this policy is under 
review, but any changes are unlikely to represent a significant shift away 
from prioritizing individual accountability. First, Rosenstein said as 
much: “[A]ny changes will reflect our resolve to hold individuals 
accountable for corporate wrongdoing.”9 Moreover, the call for 
individual prosecutions remains as popular as ever, and it seems 
politically unwise to roll back this policy. Finally, the Trump 
administration has continued to promulgate new policies and 
advisories—in the context of both the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA)10 and the United States Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission11—consistent with the Yates Memo’s emphasis on 
individual prosecutions. 
Accordingly, there is little reason to expect a shift away from public 
and official demands for individual liability in cases of corporate 
misconduct. Demanding individual accountability in the abstract makes 
good sense. Prosecuting corporations is, and always has been, 
problematic. Doing so visits the wrongs of an agent on generally innocent 
owners. Punishing innocent owners for wrongs committed through 
property is not without precedent or reason.12 Indeed, when I teach a 
seminar on corporate criminal liability, we always read a terrific maritime 
case about piracy on the Atlantic during the summer of 1840.13 The case 
is interesting because the court permits the seizure and forfeiture of the 
 
8. Id. at 4. 
9. See Rod J. Rosenstein, U.S. Deputy Attorney Gen., Keynote Address at the NYU Program 
on Corporate Compliance & Enforcement (Oct.  6, 2017), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/ 
default/files/upload_documents/Rosenstein%2C%20Rod%20J.%20Keynote%20Address_2017.1
0.6.pdf. 
10. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-47.120; see Rod J. Rosenstein, 
Remarks at the 34th International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-34th-
international-conference-foreign (emphasizing the “Department’s commitment to hold individuals 
accountable for criminal activity” and further stating, “Effective deterrence of corporate corruption 
requires prosecution of culpable individuals. We should not just announce large corporate fines and 
celebrate penalizing shareholders.”). 
11. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Div. of Enforcement, Enforcement Advisory: 
Cooperation Factors in Enforcement Division Sanction Recommendations for Companies, 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/lega
lpleading/enfadvisorycompanies011917.pdf (stating that quality of corporate cooperation should 
be assessed in part on whether there was full disclosure of the “identities of individual wrongdoers 
within the organization, including culpable senior executives, where applicable”). 
12. For an excellent overview of two ancient rationales for such punishments, see Albert W. 
Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359 
(2009). 
13. See Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210 (1844). 
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brig involved, notwithstanding the fact that the owners were entirely 
innocent and unaware of the piracy.14 
Corporate criminal liability functions similarly. Fining a corporation 
most directly affects shareholders—not management and not those who 
engaged in misconduct.15 Whether viewed through a retributive or 
deterrence lens, entity-level liability is at best unsatisfying.16 Moreover, 
even accepting the viability of deterring corporate malfeasance through 
criminal liability, the mechanism is extremely attenuated. The agency 
problem, differing time horizons, and variable risk tolerances make 
entity-level punishment an inefficient method of deterring individual 
corporate agents. 
There are good reasons to punish corporations qua corporations. The 
best reason, I believe, is that a system that never holds corporations 
criminally accountable sends a harmful message that threatens to 
undermine its perceived legitimacy: namely, at the corporate level, 
crimes are merely priced.17 But for those who want to actually punish and 
deter wrongdoing, it is difficult to improve upon individual 
accountability. 
The call for more individual criminal prosecutions is therefore 
understandable and unlikely to dissipate, either as a matter of public 
demand or formal policy. And yet, I believe that it is misguided. 
Demanding more criminal prosecutions against individuals in cases of 
corporate misconduct will mostly impact relatively low-level offenders. 
The engineer, the site manager, the accountant—not the senior executive 
or director—bears the brunt of these policies. Yet low-level prosecutions, 
even if deserved, accomplish little in terms of changing corporate culture. 
Moreover, prosecuting lower-level employees for corporate misconduct 
risks aggravating the perceived accountability problem through the 
appearance of scapegoating, as senior personnel still evade punishment. 
At the Symposium, I offered a host of reasons for why increasing 
individual prosecutions will fail to achieve the goals of those calling for 
 
14. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, Individual Accountability for Corporate Crime, 34 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 335, 34548 (2018). 
15. See John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry 
into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 401 (1981). There can be, and 
generally is, overlap between these categories because management and employees frequently 
number among shareholders; however, if the penalty falls on shareholders, it does so with no regard 
for differing degrees of culpability. 
16. There is no good theory of desert-based punishment of corporations, and while corporations 
are subject to deterrence, that alone cannot justify the imposition of criminal (as opposed to civil) 
penalties. See Gregory M. Gilchrist, The Expressive Cost of Corporate Immunity, 64 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1, 7 (2012). 
17. Id. 
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such an increase. I have written on this issue before,18 and the topic 
generates controversy.19 In this Essay, I will elaborate on one particular 
challenge for individual prosecutions: the asymmetry problem. 
There are three forms of asymmetry worth immediate mention in this 
context. The most fundamental asymmetry is the knowledge gap between 
corporate management and law enforcement. That is, in most—but not 
all—scenarios, the insiders (management) know more about the targeted 
conduct than the outsiders (law enforcement). This is not unique to 
corporate law enforcement; it is generally the case that those involved in 
criminal conduct know more about the conduct than those tasked with 
policing it.20 The entire enterprise of policing might be understood as an 
effort to bridge an epistemic gap between some part of the public and the 
government. This Essay necessarily considers this informational 
asymmetry between the government and individual corporate actors, but 
it is not my primary topic. 
Two other forms of asymmetry, internal to the firm, are my focus. 
First, management has less information than the entity as a whole. 
Second, executives have disproportionate power over the course of most 
investigations. The former represents informational asymmetry, and the 
latter represents power asymmetry. Each creates problems for individual 
accountability. In what follows, I consider each in turn. 
I.  INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
The most fundamental problem for individual prosecutions in cases of 
corporate misconduct is that many individuals who may be, in some 
sense, “responsible” for the misconduct will not be aware of it. The 
corporate hierarchy systematically shields management and senior 
personnel from a lot of corporate knowledge. Corporate leaders often lack 
 
18. See generally Gilchrist, supra note 14; Gregory M. Gilchrist, Opacity, Fragility, & Power: 
Lessons from the Law Enforcement Response to the Financial Crisis, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 647 
(2018) [hereinafter Gilchrist, Opacity, Fragility, & Power]. 
19. See Rakoff, supra note 2; see also MARY KREINER RAMIREZ & STEVEN A. RAMIREZ, THE 
CASE FOR THE CORPORATE DEATH PENALTY: RESTORING LAW AND ORDER ON WALL STREET 
(2017). 
20. While not unique to big business, it may be particularly pronounced in the financial industry. 
See Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the 
Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1499 (1993) (arguing that the 
“ephemeral nature of financial truths,” aggravated by disincentives to publish findings and the lack 
of personnel movement between industry and regulators resulting from extreme salary differentials, 
puts financial regulators at a distinct informational disadvantage); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Intrinsic Imbalance: The Impact of Income Disparity on Financial Regulation, L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., 2015, at 97, 109 (“[I]nformation asymmetry [in the financial industry] can prevent 
regulators from fully understanding financial innovations and products.”). 
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knowledge, and hence lack a guilty mind, or mens rea.21  
Corporations, of course, are not real and do not know anything. 
Corporate knowledge refers to the set of knowledge held by all corporate 
agents. Corporations act only through agents.22 Corporate awareness of 
those acts is coextensive with the set of agents’ knowledge of those acts. 
Because the agents are distributed throughout the corporate structure, so 
too is the knowledge. 
Accordingly, corporations often mask individual conduct. The 
corporate form is an elegant shorthand for something far more complex. 
It may be easy to describe a particular corporate action by referencing a 
corporate act, such as, “Apple introduced a new iPhone today.” And yet 
it may be nearly impossible to describe that same action only by 
referencing actions by real, live people. This is not to say it is actually 
impossible; indeed, it is necessarily possible. Any corporate action can 
only be comprised of acts by real people.23 But, to discuss the matter at 
the level of individual actions introduces tremendous complexity and 
undermines comprehension or even comprehensibility.24 Imagine trying 
to describe the action of a wave only by referencing actions at the 
molecular level. With sufficient time and computing power, there is no 
reason this could not be done; but even were it done, something would be 
lost. The wave matters. So too with corporations. 
Consider a company’s decision to introduce code into a car’s computer 
system that will evade environmental testing requirements.25 For the 
corporation to do this, at least one employee must write that code. 
Assume a single employee wrote the code; it does not follow that she 
understands that the code will be triggered by a government test. 
Moreover, quite likely the coder does not know the legal standard 
measured by the prospective test. To evade that standard, someone, likely 
a different person, will need to determine the relevant standard. Someone, 
possibly yet different, will need to learn how the test is conducted. Yet 
another person may need to figure out what condition correlates with 
testing and not with routine driving, so as to trigger the cheating code at 
the appropriate time. Someone else may need to instruct the coder what 
 
21. Joseph W. Yockey, FCPA Settlement, Internal Strife, and the “Culture of Compliance”, 
2012 WIS. L. REV. 689, 695 (“[I]ssues of mens rea are often the most difficult elements in FCPA 
and other white-collar crime cases to prove.”). 
22. 2 NICHOLS CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE FORMS § 59:61 (2018) (“Corporations 
can act only through natural persons such as its directors, employees or other agents.”). 
23. Id. 
24. See Gilchrist, supra note 16, at 1618. 
25. See Jack Ewing, 10 Monkeys and a Beetle: Inside VW’s Campaign for ‘Clean Diesel’, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/25/world/europe/volkswagen-diesel-
emissions-monkeys.html. 
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code she should write, though notably, maybe not why. Even this 
illustration is itself almost surely too simple. Many more people will 
likely be involved in generating this single corporate action. 
For any corporate action, many people will have some knowledge of 
the action or events that led to it. Also, many people will need to act in a 
particular manner to contribute to that ultimate action. But, it is also true 
that, sometimes, no person will have knowledge of all these links in the 
chain. No one person may be aware of all the facts and actions that make 
up the corporate act. This is true whether the act is the decision to raise 
sales quotas, the decision to hire a particular individual, or the decision 
to introduce code to cheat emissions tests. 
Preet Bharara captured this phenomenon when he explained that “[a] 
particular person may have had only partial knowledge, and contributed 
in a chain of actions.”26 He described this “problem in business culture,” 
as “siloing,” and pointed out that it could undermine compliance.27 Silos 
have traditionally developed in large companies along product lines (e.g., 
food; home care; beauty and personal care), and along functions (e.g., 
human resources; legal; sales; design; manufacturing), and along 
geographic locations (e.g., Asia, Latin America, Europe).28 Given the 
matrices of product, function, and location, silos can and do overlap; 
however, silos effectively limit information transfer to some degree, even 
as they create other efficiencies.29 
The hierarchical nature of corporations probably requires siloing of 
some sort. Consider Kroger. As of February 2018, the company operated 
2782 supermarkets and employed approximately 449,000 people.30 
Kroger, like any massive corporation, likely has a corporate culture that, 
to some degree, influences all operations. However, each 
brick-and-mortar store also develops its own culture. Managers, clientele, 
 
26. David Ingram, Corporate ‘Siloing’ an Obstacle to Charging GM Employees: Prosecutor, 
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2015, 5:17 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gm-settlement-
individuals/corporate-siloing-an-obstacle-to-charging-gm-employees-prosecutor-
idUSKCN0RH31B20150917. 
27. Id. 
28. See Trevor W. Nagel & Elizabeth M. Kelley, The Impact of Globalization on Structuring, 
Implementing, and Advising on Sourcing Arrangements, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 619, 627 n.21 (2007). 
29. Silos, while probably necessary in any large organization, are generally perceived as 
problematic, leading to efforts to “‘flatten silos’ and make it easier for people in different 
departments to work together.” Linda L. Hardenstein, Building Better Relationships, LEGAL 
MGMT., December 2008/January 2009, at 19, 19. While efforts to limit the silo effect are 
understandable from a number of managerial perspectives, the reality of silos within large 
organizations persists. 
30. See KROGER, NOTICE OF 2018 ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 2018 PROXY 
STATEMENT AND 2017 ANNUAL REPORT at A-5, http://ir.kroger.com/Cache/1001237179.PDF?O= 
PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=1001237179&iid=4004136. 
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employee dedication, windows, break rooms, quality of parking lots, 
number of trees—all of these factors and more will contribute to a 
particular store’s culture. And all of these vary between stores. Policies 
seek to introduce uniformity, but that is an elusive aspiration. Given the 
extent and complexity of such a massive operation, it is inconceivable 
that senior management would have any particularized understanding of 
store-level operations. At Kroger, one would expect silos to exist along 
department lines, along brand lines, along regional lines, and between 
individual stores. 
The more complex the industry, the more pronounced siloing becomes. 
An obvious “cure” to siloing is enhancing the exchange and availability 
of information, but change and complexity work against that effort. The 
financial industry suffers acutely from both challenges. Henry Hu 
describes the problem in the context of SEC disclosures: 
[I]t can be difficult for even the most well-intentioned of intermediaries 
to craft good depictions of reality, especially when the reality is highly 
complex. Modern financial innovation has resulted in objective realities 
that are far more complex than in the past. For instance, the true 
economic characteristics of new, esoteric financial products and of 
major banks involved in such innovative products are far different, and 
more subtle, than the characteristics of traditional stocks and bonds and 
of banks that only took deposits and made loans.31 
For large and complex operations, siloing does not represent a design 
failure; it represents a consequence of computational limits. There is no 
mechanism by which to describe total operations in a way that one person 
with limited time and multiple responsibilities can grasp. 
Hu introduced this problem in the context of public disclosures by 
large banks, and he recognized the possibility that if “a major bank is 
indeed ‘too complex to depict’ and pure information-type models are 
insufficient,” it raises the question of “whether it is also ‘too complex to 
exist.’”32 For the problem of public disclosures, Hu offers a possible 
technological solution: replace descriptive disclosures with direct public 
access to operational data. He explains: 
With advances in computer and Internet technologies, it may sometimes 
be possible to allow investors to “see” (download) what is effectively 
the real world itself in all its grandeur and detail. Such pure information 
can be far richer, clearer, and more granular than information that can 
be gleaned from intermediary depictions. Moreover, because of the 
 
31. Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC 
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1608 (2012). 
32. Id. at 1612. 
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disintermediation, the information conveyed is free from the taint of 
possible biases or misunderstandings on the part of the intermediary.33 
Alas, while open access may offer hope for disclosures, it cannot help 
management know more about their firm. Disclosures protect the public 
as they decide how to invest their money. Open data allows investors to 
analyze risk for themselves, using whatever tools and models they feel 
appropriate. 
This solution already exists for management, and it does little to 
address the siloing problem. A massive industry has sprung up around 
various databases for managing personnel, inventories, and every aspect 
of a business. Still, colorful graphs and numeric ratings fail to capture the 
extent of information available on the ground. Indeed, the very problem 
is that the extent of information available on the ground far exceeds 
human capacity to comprehend. Just as we cannot imagine a wave solely 
by reference to molecules, it is also true that we cannot imagine a month 
of operations at Kroger solely by reference to individual people. 
Management will always know less than the sum total of information 
known to employees down the chain. Information is limited at the top. 
Accordingly, where there is wrongdoing within a large organization, 
there is always the possibility, and indeed the likelihood, that senior 
management was simply unaware of the misconduct. This asymmetry of 
information, by itself, probably accounts for the vast majority of 
corporate criminal prosecutions with no accompanying individual 
prosecutions. The senior personnel that the public wants targeted are, for 
lack of a better word, innocent. 
Of course, innocence is both a legal concept and a moral one, and part 
of the challenge law enforcement officials face when explaining 
nonprosecutions is bridging that gap. The public may be correct to 
condemn corporate leadership for moral failings. When Tony Hayward 
pressed for more risk to achieve more reward, even at the cost of safety, 
that surely influenced the decision of on-site engineers to push forward 
with drilling on the Deepwater Horizon.34 Hayward’s push arguably 
represented a moral failing, but that does not preclude him from being 
legally innocent. In large and complex organizations, where criminal 
liability generally—and rightly35—requires mens rea, we ought to expect 
 
33. Id. at 1714. 
34. Christina Ingersoll, Richard M. Locke & Cate Reavis, BP and the Deepwater Horizon 
Disaster of 2010, MIT SLOAN MGMT. 3 (Apr. 3, 2012), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/LearningEdge/ 
CaseDocs/10%20110%20BP%20Deepwater%20Horizon%20Locke.Review.pdf (Hayward 
maintained an “aggressive growth strategy” and “spoke publicly about his desire to transform BP’s 
culture to one that was less risk averse.”). 
35. See Daniel C. Richman, Corporate Headhunting, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 270 (2014) 
(“The de facto requirement of blatant culpability—demanding that a defendant be shown to have 
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less culpability among senior management if only because senior 
management is aware of only a fraction of activity within the corporation. 
This informational gap between management and the entirety of 
corporate agents is a key problem with the demand for more individual 
prosecutions. Viable cases will more often exist against lower-level 
employees.36 The corporate structure aggregates most corporate 
action—be it making a sales pitch, billing for a medical procedure, hiring 
a new employee, or any other of the myriad of ways corporations act 
thousands of times every day—well below the level of senior 
management. 
For any given corporate function, with a few limited exceptions, such 
as board reports, public disclosures, or firm-level initiatives, lower-level 
employees will have more awareness and responsibility for any particular 
actions. Yet, those are the people who may actually have less moral guilt 
than legal guilt. 
Prosecuting lower-level employees within a massive 
organization—even where guilt is straightforward as a legal 
matter—raises difficult questions of fairness. “Do individuals sufficiently 
influence companies as large as KPMG to the extent that distributive 
justice is served by holding select midlevel employees accountable for 
widespread practices within the institution?”37 This is a real and powerful 
question. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon disaster, two men were 
charged with manslaughter and other crimes.38 The manslaughter charges 
were eventually dismissed, but other charges stuck, and any prosecution 
inflicts a serious toll on the defendant.39 It is worth asking whether those 
 
had a subjective awareness of real wrongdoing— . . . isn’t a bug in our system but a feature.”). 
36. Indeed, pushing too hard for individual prosecutions against high-level personnel in cases 
of corporate wrongdoing can simply backfire if the evidence is insufficient. As one firm has noted 
of the post-Yates Memo prosecutions in the healthcare industry: “despite the overall high 
conviction rate in criminal cases brought, the evidence required to prove criminal intent and get 
convictions in cases of corporate wrongdoing is often lacking.” Eoin P. Beirne, Health Care 
Enforcement Review and 2017 Outlook: Yates Memo in Action, MINTZ, 
https://www.mintz.com/insights-center/viewpoints/2017-01-health-care-enforcement-review-and-
2017-outlook-yates-memo (citing “two recent examples of individuals who went to trial in criminal 
health care enforcement cases after issuance of the Yates Memo” only to be acquitted on the major 
counts). 
37. Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 333 (2007). 
38. See Superseding Indictment for Involuntary Manslaughter, Seaman’s Manslaughter and 
Clean Water Act at 9, United States v. Kaluza, No. 12-265, 2013 WL 6490341 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 
2012), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/2520121115143638743323.pdf. 
39. One defendant pled guilty to a misdemeanor offense, while the other was acquitted at trial. 
See Associated Press, BP Engineer Is Not Guilty in Case from 2010 Gulf Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/business/energy-environment/bp-engineer-
is-not-guilty-in-case-from-2010-gulf-oil-spill.html?_r=0. 
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men, working a job where their superiors were pushing them for results, 
deserved to be held criminally accountable. It is also worth asking 
whether holding those individuals accountable could ever accomplish 
anything positive for corporate governance generally.40 
The information asymmetry between senior management and the 
entity as a whole simply means that in many—probably most—cases of 
corporate criminality, management cannot and should not be prosecuted. 
There will be cases in which senior executives ought to be prosecuted.41 
This, I believe, is what critics of the status quo, like Judge Rakoff, are 
really demanding. They are not asking for more prosecutions of mere 
employees behaving badly within a bad culture. They are calling for the 
dedication required—both in terms of resources and resolve—to make 
the difficult cases against senior executives where appropriate.42 
The problem lies in the disconnect between the understandable desire 
to promote more such prosecutions and the likely effect of a policy 
directing prosecutors to target individuals. To the extent prosecutors are 
driven by the prospect of recognition and success, deferred prosecution 
agreement or non-prosecution agreement resolutions accompanied by 
eye-popping fines and a New York Times headline is a relatively easy 
path. Once misconduct is public, corporations have little incentive to do 
anything other than conduct a vigorous investigation and cooperate with 
the government. In doing so, the corporation funds most of the 
investigative legwork, and presents a near complete case to the DOJ.43 
The prosecutors involved reap the rewards of having successfully 
confronted wrongdoing on a large scale within a powerful organization, 
with relatively little work. Contrast this scenario with the effort required 
to secure a conviction against a powerful individual within an 
 
40. David M. Uhlmann, The Pendulum Swings: Reconsidering Corporate Criminal 
Prosecution, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1235, 1277 (2016) (“[T]he weight of criminal prosecution 
falls on individuals who, while culpable, had no control over the corporate policies that led to 
criminal activity.”). 
41. Critics of the failure to prosecute individuals following the financial crisis frequently point 
to Enron for the proposition that power has not always precluded prosecution. As I have written 
elsewhere:  
 Enron, however, is a weak proxy for the aftermath of the financial crisis as it involved 
the failure of a single entity predicated on plain financial misstatements. The process of 
identifying wrongdoers and allocating blame was far simpler than it could ever have 
been for wrongdoing that spanned not only multiple firms, but also many industries and 
even the private and public sectors. 
Gilchrist, Opacity, Fragility, & Power, supra note 18, at 656 (footnote omitted). 
42. See Rakoff, supra note 2 (describing the difficult work required to make these cases and 
urging that prosecutors rededicate themselves to doing that work). 
43. See id. (describing the process by which corporations under criminal investigation fund and 
outsource the investigation which, upon completion, will be neatly presented to the prosecutor). 
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organization (regardless of whether that organization is a corporation, a 
criminal gang, or a political party). These are hard cases, involving 
burdensome investigative techniques—like wire taps—and the drudgery 
of building a case piece by piece, starting with low-level prosecutions and 
moving up the chain through cooperation agreements.44 Still, after all this 
work, there is no guaranteed payoff. The net result may not even be a 
“win” from the prosecutor’s perspective, either because the effort fails to 
secure sufficient evidence to target senior executives or because the 
government might still lose at trial. 
Critics of the status quo believe that federal prosecutors have become 
more reluctant to try to build these more difficult cases against 
individuals. I agree. And, I think the reason is obvious: there is little 
incentive to engage in this effort when a massive corporate settlement is 
equally lauded, or nearly so.45 Having said that, the problem remains: will 
instructing prosecutors to target guilty individuals in cases of corporate 
misconduct lead to more fulsome investigations? I am skeptical. Most 
simply, as a matter of information asymmetry, guilt will aggregate lower 
in the corporate hierarchy. Additionally, we can expect a differential in 
reported cases favoring those in which management actually has no 
exposure, regardless of how much work prosecutors are willing to put 
into building a case; this is the subject of the next section. 
II.  POWER ASYMMETRY 
Formally, the board of directors wields ultimate power and hence 
control of internal investigations. Practically, management does. In any 
event, some combination of management and the board determines how 
a company handles potential criminal conduct. Lower-level employees 
have no direct46 input on the corporate response; the power over this issue 
 
44. Id. (“If you are a prosecutor attempting to discover the individuals responsible for an 
apparent financial fraud, you go about your business in much the same way you go after mobsters 
or drug kingpins: you start at the bottom and, over many months or years, slowly work your way 
up.”). 
45. The reluctance to prosecute corporations and individuals in a more adversarial manner is 
not uniformly distributed throughout the Department of Justice.  
[S]ome parts of the Justice Department never stopped prosecuting corporate crime. The 
Environment and Natural Resources Division, historically the source of the largest 
number of corporate prosecutions, entered only two deferred prosecutions in the 
seventeen years between 1993 and 2009; the Antitrust Division, the source of the third 
largest amount of corporate prosecutions, entered only three deferred prosecutions 
during the same timeframe. 
See Uhlmann, supra note 40, at 1238–39 (footnote omitted). 
46. They may, however, have indirect means of influencing the response, either by filing a 
formal whistleblower complaint or otherwise disclosing the issue to the public. See infra notes 
56–58 and accompanying text. 
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rests entirely at the top of the hierarchy. 
Maximally prioritizing individual prosecutions generates problematic 
incentives. The Yates Memo provides that if a corporation is “[t]o be 
eligible for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the 
Department all relevant facts about the individuals involved in corporate 
misconduct.”47 Were this enforced literally, one would expect selective 
reporting only in those cases that do not implicate management or the 
board. “The ‘all or nothing’ approach to cooperation may backfire 
because it not only allows the corporation to choose ‘nothing,’ but may 
encourage that choice.”48 
Corporations cooperate with law enforcement investigating corporate 
malfeasance because and to the extent it is in the corporate interest to do 
so. At least in theory. Those responsible for directing the corporation’s 
response to possible wrongdoing are not only fiduciaries, they are people 
with their own, sometimes countervailing, interests. The agency problem 
is a powerful factor when it involves asking whether to limit corporate 
exposure if doing so increases personal exposure. If the entity is entitled 
to leniency only where the entity discloses all individual involvement, in 
cases where management or the board have exposure, the very people 
deciding whether to seek leniency for the company must do so at their 
own (potentially significant) peril. 
This conflict is not solely generated by the call for individual 
prosecutions or the policy of the Yates Memo. There will always be a 
disincentive for management to report corporate malfeasance where 
doing so could implicate management. That said, the starkness of choice 
presented by the Yates Memo—no leniency absent full disclosure of 
individual involvement—potentially exacerbates the conflict. If applied 
strictly, it is reasonable to expect less cooperation from corporations in 
those cases where the misconduct implicates49 management or the board. 
The prospect of selective self-reporting in cases that do not implicate 
management or the board highlights the need for alternative methods of 
law enforcement where management or the board is involved. The 
policing of corporations is overwhelmingly outsourced to the 
corporations themselves. Yet leniency for the entity is unlikely to 
incentivize management personnel to turn themselves in. Corporate 
governance can work to address this problem in various ways, such as 
 
47. See Yates Memo, supra note 5, at 3. 
48. Elizabeth E. Joh & Thomas W. Joo, The Corporation As Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines 
on Prosecuting White Collar Crime, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 51, 58 (2015). 
49. This could be directly, such as cases where management was involved in the wrongdoing; 
it could also be indirectly, such as where management or the board failed in some way to timely or 
appropriately detect or address misconduct within the organization. 
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appointing a compliance officer who reports directly to the board. The 
board has a duty to monitor and faces its own liability for failure to do 
so.50 Appointing an officer with responsibility for identifying and, if 
necessary, reporting criminal conduct to the board, can mitigate the 
problem of conflicted management. 
Empowering the board is a key aspect of contemporary corporate 
governance. The board of directors suffers from a greater deficit of 
information than management, and a concomitant lack of power. Yet, the 
board, as ultimately responsible and less plainly conflicted than 
management, represents the clearest avenue for directly confronting 
corporate misconduct. Empowering the board requires informing the 
board. 
Nicola Sharpe has suggested that companies empower their boards by 
adopting a process-oriented approach (POA). This approach holds: 
[D]irectors should employ a decision-making process that has at least 
four elements: (1) a forward-looking approach to information and data; 
(2) independent information-gathering mechanisms; (3) directors that 
play a proactive role in organizational goal setting; and (4) deliberation 
techniques such as a system for generating and resolving constructive 
conflict.51 
The POA thus aims to remedy information and power deficits at the 
board level. Specifically, by opening new and relatively unbounded 
channels of information to the board of directors, this POA curtails the 
problem of too little information. By introducing deliberative 
mechanisms such as a “devil’s advocate approach,”52 the POA further 
broadens the information that is likely to be presented to the board.53 By 
adopting a forward-looking and proactive role for directors, the POA 
addresses the practical limits of the disempowered board. 
Such an approach, like having a compliance officer who directly 
reports to the board, will not ensure perfect compliance or perfect 
enforcement. Nothing will. The POA, however, can contribute to better 
 
50. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
51. Nicola Faith Sharpe, Questioning Authority: The Critical Link Between Board Power and 
Process, 38 J. CORP. L. 1, 34 (2012). 
52. Id. at 39. 
53. Getting material information to the board presents a continuing challenge. Most efforts to 
address this challenge rely in some manner on gatekeepers. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case 
for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 162 (2010) (“These gatekeepers should reduce the 
problems associated with informational asymmetries by providing independent directors with an 
alternate and impartial source of information, thereby ensuring that they are not wholly dependent 
on insiders.”); JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 1 (2006) (“[A]ll boards of directors are prisoners of their gatekeepers. No board of 
directors—no matter how able and well-intentioned its members—can outperform its professional 
advisors.”). 
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corporate conduct generally. 
More still is likely necessary, however, if law enforcement is to 
identify those cases—arguably the most important cases to the public 
trust—where management or even the board itself is involved in the 
misconduct. For this, traditional law enforcement will be required. It is, 
of course, wholly unrealistic and undesirable to expect the FBI or other 
law enforcement agencies to infiltrate and surveil day-to-day corporate 
life. Most simply, the scale of corporate conduct dwarfs any conceivable 
law enforcement effort; moreover, the intrusiveness of any such 
surveillance would introduce a police state that would outweigh any 
possible benefits of more vigorous law enforcement. 
No, the law enforcement solution to the reporting gap lies not in 
enhanced surveillance; it lies in expanding the pool of likely reporters. If 
management is unlikely to report a predictable range of cases—that is, 
those inculpating management—empower alternative reporters. The 
“broken windows” approach to street crime functioned by increasing 
contact between police and insiders generally, in hopes that the police 
could use that contact, by threat if necessary, to gain information about 
target crimes.54 It aimed to give the police “eyes on the street.”55 The 
whistleblower approach to corporate misconduct is similar in effect—it 
gives law enforcement access to inside information. But, it is distinct in 
that it requires neither an enhanced police presence nor threats against 
potential informants; instead it relies on carrots: protecting reporters from 
retaliation and paying them for successful reports. 
This is the fundamental theory behind whistleblower protections and 
incentives. Knowledge within large, publicly traded corporations is 
diffuse and widespread. Just as criminal conspiracies risk exposure by the 
unavoidable fact that more people know of the wrongful conduct, 
corporate conduct is rarely secret. Someone—often many 
someones—within the organization know about any particular conduct. 
This is true whether the conduct is lawful, plainly criminal, or somewhere 
in between. Strong whistleblower protections and incentives effectively 
deputize all corporate agents, increasing the chance that someone will 
report misconduct to the relevant authority.56 
 
54. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty of Responsible Administration and the 
Problem of Police Accountability, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 165, 188 (2016). “The ‘broken windows’ 
theory formulated by George Kelling and James Q. Wilson suggested that ‘quality-of-life’ policing 
could prevent the emergence of hot spots in transitional neighborhoods by encouraging law-abiding 
people to act as crime-inhibiting ‘eyes on the street’ and to provide information to the police.” Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
55. Id. 
56. See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Four Signal Moments in Whistleblower Law: 1983-2013, 
30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389 (2013).  
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Indeed, as the risk of whistleblower disclosure increases,57 
management’s calculus about self-reporting changes. As Andrew 
Ceresney, then-Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement stated: 
The SEC’s whistleblower program has changed the calculus for 
companies considering whether to disclose misconduct to us, knowing 
that a whistleblower is likely to come forward. Companies that choose 
not to self-report are thus taking a huge gamble because if we learn of 
the misconduct through other means, including through a 
whistleblower, the result will be far worse.58 
If management will not report, and we know sometimes they will not, 
then help others report. That is what whistleblower laws do, and they 
must be maintained if we are to have effective law enforcement in the 
corporate sphere.59 
Management’s influence over internal investigations is powerful, and 
if control over reporting is limited to management, the reports will rarely 
expose managerial misconduct. Alternative reporters are thus necessary. 
However, even with strong whistleblower protection and incentives, it is 
still reasonable to expect more wrongdoing will be reported against 
lower-level employees than management. In part, this conclusion merely 
restates the conclusion one ought to draw from informational asymmetry: 
there will be more knowing misconduct down the hierarchy of the 
corporation simply because that is where most knowledge resides. 
 
The whistleblower reports information or makes allegations, sometimes to external 
regulators, watchdog groups, or the media, and sometimes internally (though often 
outside of the chain of command). From the beginning of the practice we now call 
whistleblowing such employees have faced retaliation—the threat of which, along with 
other incentives, favored remaining silent. The law, thankfully, has evolved to provide 
both protection and positive incentives for whistleblowers. 
Id. at 390 (footnotes omitted). 
57. Whistleblower actions have generally been on the rise. The SEC reports: in FY 2017, “the 
SEC ordered whistleblower awards totaling nearly $50 million to 12 individuals. Since the agency 
issued its first award in 2012 through the end of September 2017, the program has awarded 
approximately $160 million in whistleblower awards to 46 individuals.” U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 1, 
https://www.sec.gov/files/sec-2017-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf [hereinafter SEC 
2017 REPORT]. Additionally, the SEC reports an increase in whistleblower tips from 334 in FY 
2011 to 4484 in FY 2017. Id. at 23. 
58. Andrew Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enf’t, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at CBI’s 
Pharmaceutical Compliance Congress in Washington, D.C.: FCPA, Disclosure, and Internal 
Controls Issues Arising in the Pharmaceutical Industry (Mar. 3, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2015-spch030315ajc.html. 
59. The SEC concludes that “the promise of monetary awards to whistleblowers whose 
information leads to successful enforcement actions, provisions to safeguard whistleblower 
confidentiality, and enhanced anti-retaliation protections” are the key components of a successful 
whistleblower program. See SEC 2017 REPORT, supra note 57, at 3. 
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CONCLUSION 
When there is a great failure, the public demands consequences for 
those responsible. With limited information, there will often be confusion 
about who is responsible for the failure. Moral responsibility, leadership 
responsibility, and cultural responsibility are all important; they are also 
all distinct from legal responsibility. This can be lost on an angry public. 
Demanding accountability is natural. Prosecuting individuals is 
something different; it is not natural, it is highly structured and controlled. 
Prosecutors ought to bring cases where they are convinced that they can 
prove guilt of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. For the vast majority 
of crimes at issue in cases of corporate wrongdoing, that requires proving, 
at a minimum, that the defendant was aware of the actions at issue. As a 
simple matter of corporate structure, this awareness will often be lacking 
for senior personnel. 
Such informational asymmetry is thus perhaps the strongest argument 
against a formulaic push for individual prosecutions. Power asymmetry 
amplifies the problem. To the extent senior personnel can influence 
which instances of misconduct come to light, they can be expected to 
avoid disclosing the problems for which they have legal exposure. 
Whistleblowers and better governance may ameliorate this problem, but 
they will not eliminate it. 
Both types of in-firm asymmetry suggest that the push for more 
individual prosecutions will result largely in prosecutions against bit 
players in massive organizations. These prosecutions will hardly satisfy 
the public demand for accountability, and they may do affirmative harm. 
Even where the real person is actually guilty, there remain open questions 
about desert. How should we punish someone for a wrong she committed 
while functioning in a culture and structure that influenced her actions? 
Indeed, how should we punish her when it becomes clear that she could 
never hope to influence the culture and structure that were but-for causes 
of her crime? 
This is not to suggest that a person ought to be excused by the culture 
in which they are operating. My suggestion is more modest. Calling for 
more individual prosecutions in cases of corporate crime is 
understandable, but we ought to think about what the call is likely to net. 
In part because of the asymmetries discussed in this Essay, it is unlikely 
to net a significant increase in accountability at the top. It is far more 
likely to net increased responsibility for lower-level personnel. And there 
are many reasons to question whether that result is actually desirable. 
